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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XXI JUNE, 1936 No. 4
RESERVATION OF CONTROL BY THE SETTLOR OF A
PRIVATE TRUST AS AFFECTED BY FEDERAL
TAX LEGISLATION*
BY PHILIP A. MAXEINER
Taxes, at their best, are bothersome creatures. The battle be-
tween the taxpayer and the government is an incessant one. The
government constantly bombards the fortifications of the tax-
payer. With legalistic ingenuity of the same order, the taxpayer
constantly seeks new defensive measures. Tax lawyers are the
strategists for both sides in this endless battle of wits.
Impartially, the judges look down from their heights upon the
ever-lasting conflict, here and there planting a judicial bomb
which destroys the well-laid plans of both the government and
the taxpayer. Both are within their legal rights. The govern-
ment has its prerogative to tax; the taxpayer his license to escape
taxation. "There is nothing unlawful, or even mildly unethical,
in the motive of the petitioner, to avoid some portion of the bur-
den of taxation."' The courts, as unbiased arbiters, have con-
sistently given approval a disposition of property in the manner
best suited to lessen the burden of taxation. As expressed by the
oft quoted words of Mr. Justice Holmes, in Bullen v. Wisconsin,2
"We do not speak of evasion, because, when the law draws a
line, a case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe
side is none the worse legally that a party has availed him-
self to the full of what the law permits. When an act is con-
demned as an evasion what is meant is that it is on the
wrong side of the line indicated by the policy if not by the
mere letter of the law."
* Submitted in fulfillment of requirement for degree of Doctor of Juris-
prudence, Washington University, 1936.
1 Marshall v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 633.
2 (1916) 240 U. S. 625.
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Perhaps in no one field of taxation has there been such a con-
flict as that arising within the last twenty years in the realm of
trusts. A discussion of the entire problem is clearly beyond the
scope of any one article. An inquiry into the attempts of the
settlor to reserve control as affected by the manipulations by
Congress of its taxing powers is all that will be attempted here.
Following a general introductory discussion of the question a
thorough analysis seems logically to divide into three phases,
first, control by the settlor alone, secondly, control by the settlor
plus another, thirdly, control by the reservation of a prior par-
ticular estate.
I. THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL
A. The Incidents of a Trust
Though undoubtedly the problem has become of vast im-
portance during the past two decades it is by no means of such
recent origin. Trusts have long served as means of escape from
the embarrasments of ownership and the onerous duties of tax-
ation. Their prevalence for such a purpose was recognized so
long ago as the reign of Henry the Eighth; and the now famous
Statute of Uses was passed to prevent the avoidance of feudal
dues by such means.3 The Statute merely converted the beneficial
use into legal ownership and therefore did not abolish trusts as
such. In fact it was perhaps after the enactment of this statute
that trusts began to grow in legal prominence. As Lord Chief
Justice Mansfield observed, "Trusts are made to answer the
exigencies of families, and all other purposes, without producing
one of the inconveniences, frauds, or private mischiefs which the
statute of Henry VIII, c. 10, was intended to avoid."'4
The advantage of the trust lies in the fact that the settlor can
rid himself of the troublesome elements of ownership and at the
same time retain perhaps not only the beneficial interest but also
the element of control. It is this unwillingness to relinquish all
3 The Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII, Ch. 1 (1535). Quoting from the
preamble: "Where ... by reason whereof, and by occasion of which fraudu-
lent feoffments, fines, recoveries and other like assurances to uses, confi-
dences and trusts, . . ., the Lords have lost their wards, marriages, reliefs,
harriots, escheats, aids pur fair fits chivalier, and pur fil marier, . ..; the
King's highness hath lost the profits and advantages of the lands of per-
sons attainted, and of the lands craftily put in feoffments to the uses of
aliens born, and also the profits of waste for a year and a day of lands of
felons attainted, and the Lords their escheats thereof; . . ."
4Burgess v. Wheate (1757), 1 Eden 177, 1. c. 223, 28 Eng. Rep. 670.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss4/1
TRUSTS AND TAXATION
power and control over the trust corpus, or even over the income,
which causes the collision with the taxing statutes.
The validity of the trusts has not, strangely enough, been seri-
ously questioned by the courts when involving themselves with
the taxing statutes.5 A trust may be perfectly valid under the
elements of trust law, and yet, so far as the principles of taxation
are concerned, be considered as taxable to the settlor6 However,
in taxing to the settlor the income or corpus of a trust, Congress
does seem to have been influenced by some of the distinctions
bearing upon the validity of a trust. The retention of control,
thereby preventing the complete passing of the beneficial inter-
est, is the all important element. The problem is twofold. It in-
volves, for purposes of the income tax, the distinction between a
valid trust and an agency, and for purposes of the estate tax the
distinction between a transfer inter vivos by deed, and a transfer
by will, to a trustee.
"The germ of agency is hardly to be distinguished from the
germ of another institution which in our English Law has an
eventful future before it, the 'use, trust or confidence'.'" The
features distinguishing a trust from an agency are simple of
statement but difficult of application. The creator of a trust must
keep in mind that the chief essential is that the instrument clearly
states and shows that full possession, care, custody, control, and
management, as well as legal title passes to the trustee, until the
trust is revoked or terminated.8 He must divest himself of title
in a permanent or definitive way and must strip himself of every
interest in the subject matter of the trust estate.9 In taxing the
income from a trust as if it were the settlor's income Congress
has had in mind the retention by the settlor of the economic bene-
fits and control. When there is no such retention the resulting
instrument is clearly a valid trust, and, generally speaking, is
free from taxation to the settlor.
5 Though of course they are urgently concerned with the problem as to
whether one or several trusts have been created, thereby splitting up the
income. See Wynne v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 473.
6 The trustor may reserve the right to alter or amend and to revoke the
trust instrument in whole or in part without affecting its validity, McEvoy
v. Boston Five Cent Bank (1909) 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. E. 465, yet such a
trust is clearly taxable to the settlor's estate under the present tax laws.
I Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, Vol. II, p. 228.
s Restatement, Trusts, sec. 8.
9 DuPont v. Commissioner (1933) 289 U. S. 685.
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The theoretical difference between a transfer by deed inter
vivos and a transfer by will to a trustee is again quite simple of
statement. A deed has an immediate operative effect to pass a
present or future interest in property, either vested absolutely,
vested subject to being divested, or contingent, whereas a will has
no immediate operative effect. Worthy of consideration is the
intent of the decedent, as well as the time of taking effect mani-
festly expressed upon the face of the instrument. A deed passes
present interests to the grantee. If the grantor holds back for
himself extremely broad rights and powers may he not reduce
the interest granted to the grantee until it becomes in fact illu-
sory? It is when the shifting of the economic interests is subject
to some further action, or lack of action, on the part of the
settlor before it passes to the beneficiaries that its validity as a
transfer by deed comes in question, and Congress seeks to levy
the tax against,the settlor's estate.
Originally the task of the draftsman consisted chiefly in fram-
ing the trust instrument in such a way as to effectuate the ex-
pressed intention and desire of the settlor as to the disposition
of the property, while at the same time observing the necessary
formalities avoiding collision with such restrictions as those
found in the rule against perpetuities and the rule against re-
straints on alienation. Today, due regard for the interests of his
clients compels him to realize that a trust settlement may be
framed in such a way as to approach perfection from these points
of view, yet be seriously defective because it exposes the settlor's
estate or the trust property and the beneficiaries to unnecessarily
heavy tax burdens.10 In determining whether the trust form will
be disregarded the elements of control retained by the settlor are
of chief significance. The retention of too many of these elements
indicates that there has been no material change in the settlor's
relationship to the property conveyed.
B. The Statutes Involved
The rapidly changing legislation in this field necessitates a
consideration of each decision in light of the specific statutes in-
volved, and with the subsequent statutory changes in mind.
Transfers in trust which, a few years ago, were free from tax-
ation, today fall within the categories defined by the statutes and
20 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) Vol. 2, p. 836.
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are thereby taxable. Definitely to state that certain factual situ-
ations are not taxable is to fail to reckon with the uncertainties
of the Congressional mind. The present statutes have narrowed
toward extinction the avenues of escape from taxes upon trans-
fers of property without consideration. Before an intelligent dis-
cussion of the diverse situations which have presented them-
selves to the courts may be had a brief general discussion of the
applicable statutes is essential.
A system of inheritance taxation restricted in scope to the dis-
position of property by will or intestacy would be futile. Little
ingenuity is required to circumvent such legislation by inter
vivos dispositions reserving to the transferor the benefits of
ownership. Provisions of the Federal Estate Tax reaching these
transfers thus impart effectiveness to an otherwise feeble meas-
ure. First enacted by Congress in 191611 the development of the
estate tax has ever been a struggle more fully to effectuate the
Congressional intent to tax the entire estate possessed by one
during his lifetime. No one has the inherent right to transfer
property to others at his death, either by will or intestacy. The
right to take property by will or descent is a privilege, and the
authority conferring the privilege may impose conditions upon
its exercise. 12 The tax thus devised by Congress is not upon the
property but is laid upon the privilege of transmitting property
at death.13
The principal auxiliary provisions of the first enactment were
the taxing of an interest or trust created in contemplation of
death or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death. The former was included because such a transfer
is considered to be testamentary in effect, and such a provision
was necessary to prevent circumvention of the law. 4 Transfers
in actual contemplation of death have characteristics in common
11 Rev. Act of 1916, sec. 200 et seq. 39 Stat. 777.
12 Knowlton v. Moore (1900) 178 U. S. 41. The power to impose condi-
tions is not, however, unlimited. The provisions as to due process in both
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as similar provisions in
State Constitutions, are restricting hands.
is Coolidge v. Long (1931) 282 U. S. 582; Y. M. C. A. v. Davis (1924)
264 U. S. 47; Ithaca Trust Co. v. U. S. (1929) 279 U. S. 151. It is collected
on the transfer of his estate by the decedent and thus is known as the
Estate or Transfer tax.
'Keeney v. N. Y. (1912) 222 U. S. 525; Milliken v. U. S. (1931) 283
U. S. 15.
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with transfers at death so as to justify the inclusion of the
former with the latter in the scheme of taxation. Whether trans-
fers are in contemplation of death is largely a question of the
particular facts involved. Confronted with the difficulty of proof
of such contemplation, statutory presumptions have been en-
acted.1
Closely allied with transfers in contemplation of death are
those taking effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death.
While they are within the same category for the purpose of tax-
ation there is a clear line of demarcation between them. Gifts
to take effect at or after death are distinguished from testamen-
tary transfers in that they are made during life, usually by trust
deed or declaration of trust. They are distinguished from gifts
in contemplation of death in that the motive is not considered in
the former. From the viewpoint of taxation there is, in principle,
no difference between property passing by deed intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the
grantor and property passing by will or intestacy. In either case
it is the privilege of disposing of property after the death of the
grantor or testator which is taxed. Experience soon demonstrat-
ing the inadequacies of this system, Congress included in the
revenue act of 1918 the value of property passing under a power
of appointment exercisable by the decedent as well as amounts
receivable under insurance policies upon the life of the decedent. 0
There remained as two important means of tax avoidance:
inter vivos gifts and the possibilities afforded by the trust device.
Thus the revenue act of 1924 saw the birth of two new prodigies.
The Estate Tax added a provision including in the value of the de-
cedent's estate such transfers as were subject to revocation,17
and the Gift tax was enacted taxing all inter vivos gifts.1 8 The
isIn 1926 was enacted the so called "irrebutable presumption" clause
-which provided that gifts made within two years of death are made in con-
templation of death. Rev. Act. of 1926, see. 302 (c) 44 Stat. 70. However
this clause was held unconstitutional in Heiner v. Donnan (1932) 285 U. S.
312. Thus in 1932 the provision was dropped and under the present law
there is merely a rebuttable presumption.
16 Rev. Act of 1918, sec. 402 (e), (f). 40 Stat. 1097. Sec. (f) as to insur-
ance is subject to certain exemptions, viz., 40,000 as to insurance payable
to specific beneficiaries.17 Rev. Act of 1924, sec. 302 (d). 43 Stat. 304.
18 Rev. Act of 1924, sec. 319 et seq. 43 Stat. 313. Until this time pay-
ments of money or irrevocable transfers of property which were wholly
or partially donative in character were not taxed by the federal govern-
ment unless they fell within the scope of the estate tax.
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gift tax, owing to alleged administrative difficulties,"9 was re-
pealed in 1926, but it has reappeared in the 1932 act and has con-
siderably minimized the advantages of estate tax avoidance by
means of outright gifts inter ViVOS. 20
Following the decision in May v. Heiner2' wherein the Supreme
Court held that if the settlor created an irrevocable trust inter
vivos, retaining only the income from the trust property to him-
self for life, the trust was not taxable at his death as a transfer
"intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death," Congress enacted an amendment to the revenue act of
1926, providing for the inclusion under the federal estate tax of
inter vivos transfers in trust where the settlor reserved a life
income.2
2
With the passage of the sixteenth amendment and the subse-
quent taxing of incomes the trust was immediately seized upon
as a source of aid to the taxpayer. It became a rather common
occurrence for a wealthy person whose income was large enough
to be subject to the higher rates of surtax, to convey a consider-
able portion of his estate to trustees to pay the income in desig-
nated shares to his wife and to one or more of his children, re-
serving however, .the power to direct the management of the
trust property and the investment of the funds, as well as the
power to revest title in himself if he should so choose to do.23 In
this manner his income was split up and his tax bill greatly re-
19, It also met with constitutional difficulties, the Supreme Court refusing
to apply it retroactively. Blodgett v. Holden (1927) 275 U. S. 142; Unter-
myer v. Anderson (1928) 276 U. S. 40. Though the constitutionality of the
act itself was upheld. Bromley v. McCaughn (1929) 280 U. S. 124.
20 The present rates ire approximately two-thirds the general level of
rates under the Federal Estate Tax. And it must be remembered that the
gift tax is due and payable immediately at the time of the gift, whereas
the estate tax is not payable until the decedent's death. Thus the elements
of present value and compound interest play an important part in determin-
ing the ultimate advantage of the use of the trust.
21 (1930) 281 U. S. 238. In this case the settlor reserved the income to
herself only after the death of her husband. Thus this direct statement was
really dicta. However the applicability of this dicta to a situation where the
settlor reserved directly to himself a life estate with a vested remainder in
fee limited over was the basis for the decisions in three Per Curiam deci-
sions rendered March 2, 1931. Burnet v. Northern Trust Co. (1931) 782;
Morsman v. Burnet (1931) 283 U. S. 783; McCormick v. Burnet (1931) 283
U. S. 784.
22 Enacted March 3, 1931, the day following the reading of these three
Per Curiam decisions. (1934) 26 U. S. C. A. 411 (c), 46 Stat. 1516.
23 Op. Cit., note 10, p. 862.
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duced by escaping the higher brackets of the surtax, while at
the same time he reserved to himself virtually complete control
over the property. It became evident that if the tax were to be
effective, this loophole would have to be closed, and thus the act
of 1924 inserted a provision taxing as income of the grantor the
income of any trust in which the grantor retained the power,
alone or with the consent of someone not a beneficiary to revest
in himself, at any time during the taxable year, title to any part
of the corpus.24 The phrasing of the statute proved unfortunate
and thus in 1934 the provision "at any time during the taxable
year" was deleted and it now reads, "where at any time the
power to revest .... ,,25
With these statutory enactments and their subsequent judicial
application well in mind, the writer has concluded that the pur-
pose of Congress 28 in enacting these auxiliary provisions to the
Estate Tax and Income Tax was to tax to the settlor the income
and corpus of transfers in trust in which the settlor has not re-
linquished the economic benefits therein. It is the retention of
control over these economic benefits which subjects him to the
income tax. It is their retention in such a manner that his death
causes them to pass from him to another which- brings them with-
in the scope of the estate tax. It must be added that an additional
incentive has influenced the progress of the Estate Tax, that is,
a desire to tax the entire estate possessed by one during his life-
time. The Gift Tax adds to the strength of this position. It is
with these principles in mind that we proceed to a consideration
of the cases.
II. CONTROL BY THE SETTLOR ALONE
A. The Right to Revoke
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be deter-
mined by including the value at the time of his death of all
property....
d) Revocable Transfers.
To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise,
2 4 Rev. Act of 1924, sec. 219 (g), 43 Stat. 276.
25 Infra, note 45 wherein cases circumventing this provision are discussed.
Rev. Act. of 1934, see. 166, 48 Stat. 729.1 26Aside from the always elementary desire to produce revenue. See Hel-
vering v. Stockholm Enskilda Bank (1934) 293 U. S. 84, 1. c., 89, wherein
the court said, "The General object of this act is to put money into the fed-
eral treasury."
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where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his
death to any change through the exercise of a power, either
by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any person, to
alter, amend or revoke, or where the decedent relinquished
any such power in contemplation of his death, except in the
case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth .... 28
There can be no doubt that, barring constitutional difficulties,
under this statute a transfer in trust wherein the settlor reserves
to himself alone a power to alter, amend or revoke, will be prop-
erly included in his gross estate. Yet even before the inclusion
of this comprehensive provision the courts had very little diffi-
culty in holding such a transfer taxable as part of the decedent's
estate.2 9 Under the clause taxing "transfers to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death" the Supreme Court
has clearly held such to be taxable.30 The Estate Tax seeks to
impose itself upon the transfer of the enjoyment of the property
from the dead to the living. Granting that Congress has the
power to levy a tax upon the net estate of a decedent it may
adopt any reasonable measure of that tax.31 And it is reason-
able to measure it by the value of property of which the de-
cedent during his lifetime has made a disposition which partakes
of the nature of a testamentary disposition. Obviously in such
a situation the intent of the settlor is that the principal of the
trust shall not vest in full possession and enjoyment until after
the death of the settlor.32 Upon the death of the settlor the en-
joyment of the property passes to others as effectively as though
bequeathed by will. And it is the shifting and relinquishment of
such economic benefit which the statute taxes.33
A constitutional question vigorously urged by the taxpayer was
28 26 U. S. C. A. 411 (1934).
29 Bullen v. Wise. (1916) 240 U. S. 625. This case involved a itate stat-
ute taxing transfers "to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death." The settlor reserved the right to revoke the trust, and the trust
was held includible in the settlor's estate.30 Reinecke v. No. Trust Co. (1929) 278 U. S. 339.
a' Coolidge v. Nichols (1925) 4 F. (2d) 112, affd. (1927) 274 U. S. 531.
82 As Justice Holmes said in Bullen v. Wisconsin, supra, which seems to
be the earliest case presented to the Supreme Court on the subject of
powers of revocation in heritance taxation, "The words of Lord St. Leon-
ards apply with full force to the present attempt to escape the Wisconsin
inheritance tax. 'To take a distinction between a general power and a
limitation in fee is to grasp at a shadow while the substance escapes!'
33 U. S. v. Stark (C. C. A. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 453.
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that of retroactivity. Retroactivity in itself does not seem to be
objectionable. The objectionable feature arises when the law re-
sults in the taking of property without due process in violation
of the fifth amendment.34 Relying upon the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Nichols v. Coolidge several federal courts de-
cided that a trust, reserving a power of revocation, was not tax-
able as part of the decedent's estate; that though they were sub-
ject to inclusion in his gross estate under the statute, as thus
applied it was fatally retroactive. 5 The Supreme Court, however,
soon corrected this erroneous view ruling that a "transfer made
subject to power of revocation in the transferor is not complete
until his death."38 Though the taxing statute was passed after
the establishment of the trust its application was not fatally re-
troactive since the settlor's death followed its enactment. Today
there is no doubt as to the inclusion in the grantor's estate of a
transfer in trust reserving to the settlor the right to alter, amend
or revoke, regardless of the date of formation of the trust. 7
The Gift Tax is merely a means to an end. It is in accord with
the desire of Congress to tax the transfer of the entire estate
34 For a discussion of this see, Neuhoff, Retrospective Tax Laws. 21 St.
L. L. Rev. 1. Nichols v. Coolidge (1927) 274 U. S. 531 "Undoubtedly Con-
gress may require that property subsequently transferred in contemplation
of death be treated as part of the estate for taxation purposes. This is nec-
essary to prevent evasion and give practical effect to the exercise of ad-
mitted power, but the right is limited by the necessity." And the case held,
"so much of 402 (c), 1919, as requires that there be included in the gross
estate of a decedent for purposes of taxation (estate) the value of property
transferred by decedent prior to its passage merely because the conveyance
was intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,
is arbitrary and capricious, amounts to confiscation and violates the consti-
tutional provision against taking property without due process of law." See
.also, Coolidge v. Long, supra, note 13.
35Stark v. U. S. (1927) 24 F. (2d) 37; Hill v. Nichols (1927) 18 F.(2d) 139 (d) "Fact that the settlor reserved the income and the right
to alter or terminate is not sufficient to bring it within that reasonable rela-
tion to the subject of the tax which is necessary in order to render the
measure a reasonable one."36 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. (1929) 278 U. S. 339. The court dis-
tinguished Nichols v. Coolidge, supra, note 34, on the ground that the trust
therein was not revocable when the taxing statute was passed.
37 Home Trust Co. v. Edwards (1929) 30 F. (2d) 976 (D) ; Dean v. Will-
,cutts (1929) 32 F. (2d) 374 (D) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn (1929) 34
F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A.); Hanna v. U. S. (1929) 68 Ct. Cl. 45; Union Trust
Co. v. U. S. (1931) 54 F. (2d) 152, cert. den. 286 U. S. 547, wherein the
decedent reserved the right to make other diposition of the property.
Burnet v. Pac. etc. Bank (1931) 45 F. (2d) 773 (C. C. A.), cert. den. 283
U. S. 825; Tait v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. (1934) 74 F. (2d) 851,
affg. 7. F. Supp. 40.
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owned by one during his lifetime. Under the 1932 revenue act
all transfers donative in character, whether in trust or otherwise,
are subject to tax.38 Consistent with the underlying economic
theory including revocable transfers in trust in the gross estate
of the decedent for purposes of the estate tax, such are not tax-
able as a gift. The gift tax is imposed upon a transfer passing
both legal and beneficial title. It taxes the passing of the eco-
nomic benefits from the property. Thus the cancellation of a
power to alter, amend or revoke a trust is taxable as a gift.39
Consequently all transfers in trust are taxable under the Gift
Tax, but when the gift is not legally complete, i. e., the settlor
reserving powers which renders the trust subject to inclusion n
his gross estate for the purposes of the Estate Tax, it is taxable
there and not as a gift.40
"The income that is subject to a man's unfettered command
and that he is free to enjoy at his own option may be taxed to
him as his income whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not."4' It is
upon this legal theory that taxation to the settlor of income from
revocable trusts has been sustained. It takes no legal reasoning
to see how easily one might avoid the higher brackets of the in-
come tax by a division of his income into trusts, at the same time
retaining full and complete authority through a power of revoca-
tion.' 2 The constitutionality of this clause was upheld in Corliss
38 Rev. Act 1932, ss. 501-532, (1934) 26 U. S. C. A. see. 550 et seq.
39 Burnet v. Guggenheim (1933) 288 U. S. 280, rev. 58 F. (2d) 188. The
decision in this case was under the 1924 Act. The 1932 act contained a
specific provision taxing such transfers. The decision in this case rendering
such a specific requirement unnecessary it was dropped in the 1934 act.
Treasury Regulation 79, Art. 3 treats the surrender of such a power as a
taxable gift. And Kate R. DeForest, (1932) 27 B. T. A. 373, held that the
date of the surrender of the power determined the time of the gift.
40 It thus may often happen that a person will make a transfer in trust
and return a gift tax upon this, and later, upon his death, the government
will properly assess and collect an estate tax upon this same property. How-
ever, the Estate Tax provides for just such a contingency allowing as a
credit against the net Estate Tax payable the amount of tax paid under
the Gift Tax. Sec. 801, Revenue Act of 1932. (1934) 26 U. S. C. A. sec.
413. The credit is however subject to some limitations and is not nearly
as simple of application as this brief statement would seem to make it.
41 Mr. Chief Justice Holmes in Corliss v. Bowers (1929) 281 U. S. 376,
I. c. 378.
42 The present provision in the revenue act applying to such transfers is
as follows: Sec. 166, 1934 Revenue Act. "Revocable Trusts. (1934) 26
U. S. C. A. sec. 166. Where at any time the power to revest in the grantor
title to any part of the corpus of the trust is vested
1) in the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any person not hay-
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v. Bowers,43 as well as its application retroactively. The income
being at all times potentially within the power and under the
control of the settlor it is taxable to him.44 Such a decision was
practically a virtual necessity if the integrity of the surtax as a
vital feature of the income tax system was to be maintained.
A brief skirmish here by the taxpayer soon forced Congress
to retrench behind the protecting walls of a statutory enactment.
The taxpayer was quick to seize upon the phrase, in the original
draft, "at any time during the taxable year," and thereby sought
to avoid the ominous burden imposed by Congress. Through a
simple but adroit legal form trusts were established, which
though revocable, were not so during the taxable year, and the
courts confirmed this practice as a successful compliance with the
terms of the statute.4 5
They were careful to point out that these disputed words were
not in the original draft of the bill as passed by the House, but
were inserted by the Senate and adopted in Conference." Thus
the application of the statute was limited to those cases where
ing a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the
corpus or the income therefrom, or,
2) in any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposi-
tion of such part of the corpus for such taxable year shall be included in
computing the net income of the grantor."4 3 Supra, note 41. Another oft cited phrase was there uttered by Mr. Chief
Justice Holmes, "But taxation is not so much concerned with the refine-
ments of title as it is with the actual command over the property taxed-
the actual benefit for which the tax is paid."
4 O'Donnell v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 634; cert. den.
290 U. S. 635; George Washington (1934) 30 B. T. A. 788.
45 Langley v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1933) 61 F. (2d) 796. The settlor
retained the right to revoke upon notice in writing given twelve months
and one day prior to its taking effect. No such notice being given the in-
come for that year was held not taxable to the grantor. Accord, Mabel A.
Ashforth (1932) 26 B. T. A. 1188; see also, Faber v. U. S. (Ct. Cl. 1932)
1 F. Supp. 859, wherein the provisions of the trust were, "shall not have
the power during any taxable year, within the meaning of the Revenue
laws of the U. S., to revest in himself title, except upon written notice de-
livered to the trustee during the preceding taxable year." Held, not tax-
able to the grantor. F. M. Canfield (1934) 31 B. T. A. 724, wherein the
trust was to expire Jan. 3, 1931, irrevocable during its existence. Held, 1930
income not taxable to the grantor. Lewis v. White (D. 1932) 56 F. (2d)
390, App. Dis. 61 F. (2d) 1046, wherein notice had to be given prior to
January first. Held, not taxable to the grantor.
4" The Senate Finance Committee, referring to this section, reportdd as
follows: "This section provides that when the grantor of a trust reserves
the right to change the trust in favor of himself, the income is taxed to
the grantor. The subdivision of the House Bill has been rewritten in order
that there shall not be taxed to the grantor the income of a trust as to which
the grantor has a power of revocation subject however to a condition which
has not happened." Leis v. White, supra 1. c. 392.
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the grantor had reserved in the trust agreement an unconditional
power by the exercise of which during any taxable year he could
control or appropriate the income derived from the trust during
that year which was actually payable to another.47 The reserva-
tion of this "unfettered command" over the income was alone
subject to the tax. And so a trust revocable upon sixty days
notice,48 and one upon six months notice,4 9 were taxable.
Judge Augustus Hand vigorously dissented in Langley v. Com-
missioner 5  contending that the "condition" referred to in the
report of the Committee could not reasonably be thought to have
been a mere notice of intention to revoke within the sole control
and whim of the settlor, but must be something of substance de-
pendent upon an occurrence other than what amounts to an exer-
cise of the power itself. From a practical taxable basis this is
by far a more logical view of the situation. The 1934 Revision
of the revenue act corrects this technicality by taxing to the
grantor the income of a trust where "at any time" the power to
revest in the grantor exists. This is in accord with the theory
that the tax shall be imposed whenever the economic benefits
remain within the control of the grantor. Apparent support for
the authority of Congress to do this is found in the dictum in
DuPont v. Commissioner. Aside from the real basis of the deci-
sion the court stated that the income from the trust was taxable
to the grantor because he did not permanently divest himself of
title, and upon this point the judges were in complete concur-
rence. 5'
47 An interesting sidelight as to this situation was presented in the case
of Richard E. Bebb, (1933) 27 B. T. A. 1091, wherein the decedent created-
a trust reserving the right to revoke by a notice given December 1, to take
effect the succeding January. By this means it was sought not only to avoid
the income tax but also the federal Estate Tax. The Board of Tax Appeals
however pointed out the distinction between 302 (d), the estate tax, and
219 (g) and said that while the income therefrom might not be taxable, un-
der the decision in Lewis v. White, supra note 45, this provision had no
effect as to the Estate Tax and it was properly taxable thereunder.
48 Simpson v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 668.
49 Clapp v. Heiner (C. C. A. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 224, affg. 34 F. (2d) 506.
50 Supra, note 45 1. c. 798, "It is evident that, if the act can be defeated
by such a simple mode of drafting a power of revocation as was employed
here, a settlor who consults skilled counsel can never be taxed upon the
income of a revocable trust. While a man has a perfect right to keep out-
side of a taxing statute if he can, such an obvious mode of completely avoid-
ing a tax while substantially occupying the position the tax was intended
to reach is not to be lightly assumed."
51 Supra, note 9. See also the decision under the Estate Tax taxing to
the settlor the corpus of revocable trusts, supra, notes 35 and 37.
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Thus whenever one establishes a trust reserving to himself
alone the power to revoke, the trust is included in his gross estate
for the purposes of the estate tax, and the income therefrom is
taxable as his income.2 The beneficial interest remains in the
grantor and is properly attributable to him for the purpose of
taxation.
B. The Right to Management
The estate tax being levied upon the transfer of economic bene-
fits it is quite evident that it is possible for the settlor to retain
to himself certain powers of control in the management. If he
goes no farther than to reserve powers which might properly be
exercised by a trustee, the trust is not taxable. The shifting of
the economic interests being complete when the trust was made
it is without the estate tax.3 Similarly it is quite proper for the
settlor to declare himself trustee and as such exercise the power
completely and solely to manage the trust property and make
payments as he sees fit. "By the declaration of trust.., the
legal title, possession and control of the trust estate passed irre-
vocably from the grantor as an individual to himself as trustee.
The effect is no different than if the trustee had been another
person."54
Still it is easily possible for a situation to arise wherein the
52 The Treasury Regulations covering this are found in Reg. 86, Art.
166-1, and have recently been amended by T. D. 4629, March 7, 1936. 1936
P. H. Fed. Tax Service, par. 15, 209.
"If the title to the corpus will revest in the grantor upon the exercise of
such power, the income of the trust is attributed to and taxable to the
grantor regardless of-
1) Whether such power or ability to retake the trust corpus to the
grantor's own use is effected by means of a power to revoke, to terminate,
to alter or amend or to appoint;
2) Whether the exercise of such power is conditioned on the precedent
giving of notice, or on the elapsing of a period of years, or on the happen-
ing of a specified event;
3) the time at which the title to the corpus will revest in the grantor in
possession and enjoyment, whether such time is within the taxable year
or not, or whether such time be fixed, determinable or certain to come . . ."
53 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. (1929) 278 U. S. 339. In this case the
settlor reserved, 1) a power of supervision as to reinvestment of the trust
funds, 2) to require the trustee to execute proxies to his nominees, 3) to
vote any shares of stock held by the trustee, 4) to control all leases executed
by the trustee, 5) to appoint successor trustees.
For an earlier case on this point see Norris v. Goodeell (D. 1927) 17 F.(2d) 181.
54 Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (Nov. 11, 1935) 80 L. Ed. (adv.)
54, 1. c. 55, 296 U. S.
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settlor attempts to reserve a power to manage in such a manner
as to render it subject to inclusion in his net estate at death. If
he retains such rights therein, or control, as defers possession
and enjoyment in the ultimate beneficiaries until his power to
control is terminated by death, his death becomes a generating
source and the transfer falls within the scope of the estate tax. 5
If the power reserved is merely one of management the transfer
in trust is still subject to the gift tax.
The reservation of the right of management has been of much
greater importance in connection with the income tax. The soli-
darity of the average family has made it possible for the tax-
payer to surrender title to another and at the same time to keep
dominion for himself, or, if not technical dominion, at least the
substance of enjoyment. Early faced with this difficulty in the
taxing of incomes, as a companion clause to the revocability pro-
vision, Congress enacted a statute taxing income which is for the
benefit of the grantor. 6 Liability for taxes does not have to rest
upon the enjoyment by the taxpayer of all the privileges and
55 Burnet v. Pacific etc. Bank, supra note 37. See also Commissioner v.
Erickson (C. C. A. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 327, cert. den. 294 U. S. 730, wherein
it was held that the power to control amounted to a power to revoke. The
settlor had the right to terminate the trust if the trustees sold any of the
corpus. And see U. S. v. Stark, (C. C. A. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 453. Investments
were subject to the control of the settlor during his lifetime, plus a power
to revoke. Considering both powers the court held, "he has reserved to
himself for life all powers and rights ordinarily incident to ownership, viz.,
possession, control, enjoyment, disposition. The nature of the trust in effect
was testamentary."
56 Rev. Act of 1924, sec. 219 (h); 43 Stat. 276. For the present act see
Rev. Act of 1934, sec. 167; (1934) 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 167. Sec. 167--'In-
come for Benefit of the Grantor.
a) Where any part of the income of a trust-
1) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having
a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the in-
come may be, held or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor;
or
2) may, in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having
a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the in-
come, be distributed to the grantor; or
3) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having
a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the in-
come may be, applied to the payment of premiums upon insurance poli-
cies on the life of the grantor (charitable exception) then such part of
the income of the trust shall be included in computing the net income
of the grantor.
b) As used in this section the term "in the discretion of the grantor"
means "in the discretion of the grantor either alone or in conjunction with
any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of
the income in question."
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
benefits enjoyed by a normal owner. It may rest upon the enjoy-
ment by the taxpayer of privileges and benefits so substantial as
to make it reasonable and just to deal with him as if he were
the owner and to tax him upon that basis57 When the ends of
the trust and the income therefrom clearly are to the benefit of
the grantor it is only just that it should be taxable to him. "The
courts will not permit themselves to be blinded or deceived by
mere forms of law, but regardless of fictions will deal with the
substance of the transaction involved.",;8
Burnet v. Wells," a milestone in income tax law, upheld the
constitutionality of Section 219 (h) and taxed as income of the
settlor the income of a trust which was used to pay annual premi-
ums upon insurance policies on the life of the insured.10 Mr.
Justice Cardozo, for the majority, pointed out that such a trust
involved a continuing exercise by the settlor of a power to direct
the application of the income along predetermined channels, and
that the use to be made of the income was subject to the will of
the grantor at all times. The dissent81 emphasized the irrevoca-
bility of the trust and upon this ground found it not taxable. A
companion decision met a unanimous court 2 as in this case the
57 An explanatory statement by the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives is of aid; referring to sec. 219 (h), now
sec. 167, it said: "Trusts have been used to evade taxes by means of provi-
sions allowing distribution of income to the grantor or its use for his benefit.
The purpose of this subdivision of the bill is to stop this evasion." H. R.
#179, 68th Cong. 1st sess. p. 21; accord, Senate Re. #179, 68th Cong. 1st
sess., pp. 25, 26.
58 Charles T. Fisher (1933) 28 B. T. A. 1164; accord. C. S. Mott. (1934)
30 B. T. A. 1040; Pillsbury v. Burnet (App. D.) (C. 1934) 67 F. (2d) 151;
Yuengling v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 971; wherein it was
said, "Income for tax purposes may include not only ownership but rights
or privileges that are mere indicia of ownership."
59 (1933) 289 U. S. 670, revg. 63 F. (2d) 425.
60 Though technically this decision is limited by the facts to the insur-
ance trust situation covered specifically by the statute, practically it has a
much broader application. The old distinction as to constructive receipt of
income seemed to be that where no liquidation of a legal obligation is in-
volved taxation of the trust income to the settlor is not permissible. But
here no legal obligation was involved and a substituted test would seem
to have been evolved, viz., one of general advantage to the settlor even
though it be an indirect advantage and lacking in-any element of legal duty.
This seems more in accord with Congressional intent.
61 Sutherland, rendering the opinion, VanDevanter, McReynolds, and
Butler concurring. "The fact here show that Wells created certain irrev-
ocable trusts. He retained no vestige of title to, interest in, or control
over, the property transferred to the trustee. The result was a present exe-
cuted, outright gift, which could then have been taxed to the settlor."62 DuPont v. Commissioner (1933) 289 U. S. 685.
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trust was to terminate at the end of three years and revert to the
settlor. The income therefrom was held taxable to the grantor,
as the grantor did not divest himself of title in any permanent or
definitive way, and did not strip himself of every interest in the
subject matter of the estate. And one who retains for himself
so many of the attributes of ownership is not the victim of
despotic power when for the purpose of taxation he is treated as
absolute owner. Hence the courts have held trust income taxable
to the grantor when there was a reservation of the right to direct
the corpus of the trust, its sale and reinvestment,621 the retain-
ing of absolute dominion over the property, rents, issues and
profits of the trust,62' retaining the right to sell and to change the
trust agreement at any time,6 3 retaining the right to dispose of
the income in amounts and to persons designated by him.2 And
so too when the income is to be accumulated for the grantor to
be distributed to him in the future it is taxable to him 5 even
though such interest is a mere reversion.6
A somewhat analogous situation arises when the income from
a trust is to be used for the support and maintenance of the set-
tlor's children. It has of late been contended by the govern-
ment, and not without support,67 that it being a father's duty to
support his minor children the income from a trust being used to
effectuate this duty should be taxable to him. And this is quite
in line with congressional intent to tax to the grantor the reten-
tion of economic benefits, although the early cases decided by the
Board of Tax Appeals and the courts did not support this theory
and when such trusts were irrevocable they were not taxable to
the grantor.6 8 Relying on Burnet v. Wells the Board of Tax Ap-
02' Clapp v. Heiner, supra, note 49.
62b Estate of Huntington (1933) 28 B. T. A. 289.
8S McCauley v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 919.
04 E. Bradley (1932) 27 B. T. A. 280.
65 Margaret S. Sawtell (1934) 32 B. T. A. 687.
00 Kaplan v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 401; and this is
taxable even though exercisable only with the consent of the trustees, as a
trustee is not a person with an adverse interest. Greenough v. Commis-
sioner (C. C. A. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 25.
67 In Burnet v. Wells, supra, note 59, though the decision did not turn on
this point, Cardozo considered the fact that "insurance for dependents is
today in the thought of many a pressing social duty," and held that paying
the premiums on insurance policies is a benefit to the settlor. See also
Pillsbury v. Burnet, supra, note 58.
" P. H. Clark (1935) 31 B. T. A. 1082; T. P. Grosvenor (1934) 31 B.
T. A. 574. This case involved the right to revoke upon three months' notice.
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peals reversed its stand in Schweitzer v. Commissioner,"0 saying,
"We are of the opinion, however, that the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in that case is equally applicable in the pro-
ceedings at bar and that income from trust funds created by
a father for the support of his minor children whom he is
bound to support, which income is received by the father
and applied for the support of his children is taxable to
him.
7 7 0
In the meantime a case involving similar features made itself
heard in the Supreme Court of the United States.71 Affirming
the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals the Court
held as taxable income of the settlor income from a trust set up
in lieu of alimony. "The creation of a trust by the taxpayer as
a channel for the application of the income to the discharge of his
obligation leaves the nature of the transaction unaltered.1' 2 By
virtue of the nature and purpose of the trust the income re-
mained attributable to the creator of the trust and accordingly
taxable to him.
The court further said, ".. . we find no warrant for a con-
struction which would preclude the laying of the tax against the
one who through the discharge of his obligation enjoys the bene-
fit of the income as though he had personally received it.""T It
is true that in the Douglas case the Supreme Court spent some
time discussing the legal obligation to pay alimony, yet it is quite
probable that the decision will have a far wider effect. It has
already been extended by the Court to include those trusts, the
income from which is to be used for the support of the settlor's
Commissioner v. Yeiser (C. C. A. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 956, revocable by the
trustee who was her husband, but held not revocable in the eyes of the law.
He was also a beneficiary. See also a long list of B. T. A. decisions cited
in Schweitzer v. Commissioner. Until this decision the B. T. A. had con-
sistently held (C. C. A. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 702, that the income from a trust
of this character, or analogous to it, was income to the beneficiaries and
not to the creator of the trust.69 (1934) 30 B. T. A. 155.
70In Theodore P. Grosvenor, supra, note 68, the Board reverted to its
prior rulings and expressly overruled the Schweitzer case. However, see
note 74, infra.
71 Douglas v. Willcuts (Nov. 11, 1935) 80 L. Ed. (adv.) 10, 296 U. S.-
The C. C. A. deciding the Schweitzer case had distinguished the decision
of the 8th C. C. A. in that in this case there was a legal obligation to pay
alimony, the court having so decreed the trust settlement as a substitute,
affirming a prior agreement between the parties.
72 Ibid., 1. c. 14.
78 Ibid., 1. c. 14.
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children.7 ' If carried to its logical conclusion this decision might
well become the vehicle for bringing within the reach of the tax
collector that larger group of irrevocable trust whose benefici-
aries are outside the immediate family of the taxpayer, but whose
welfare may be of a very tangible, though non-legalistic interest
to him. To the government the implications of such a change
would be great, since through this use of the doctrine of con-
structive receipt the efficacy of the trust device as a significant
means of tax avoidance would be seriously impaired.
Hence reserving powers of management equivalent to those
exercised by a trustee does not, generally speaking,75 render the
trust liable to the Estate Tax, but when such powers constitute
the right to control the purposes of the trust so as to use it for
the benefit of the grantor the income therefrom is properly tax-
able to him.
C. Right to Change the Beneficiaries and the Purpose of
the Trust
A difficult situation is presented when the settlor reserves full
power to modify the terms of the trust by designating beneficiar-
ies or changing the beneficiaries already designated, but at the
same time expressly excludes the power to revest the beneficial
interest in himself. When the settlor reserves to himself alone a
power to change the ultimate beneficiaries without any limita-
tions upon whom should be named, the trust has been taxed as
part of the settlor's gross estate.76 In such a case power still re-
mains to revest ownership in himself, in effect amounting to a
power to revoke, and the transfer is not complete until the pos-
sibility of the exercise of such a power is terminated by death.77
74 In a Per Curiam decision, Schweitzer v. Commissioner, rendered Dec.
9, 1935, the Supreme Court, on authority of Douglas v. Willcuts, reversed
the 7th Circuit Court 75 F. (2d) 702, which had reversed the B. T. A.
80 L. Ed. (adv.) 221, 296 U. S.-
A similar case was also reversed, Helvering v. Stokes, 80 L. Ed. (adv.)
221, 296 U. S.-, revg. (C. C. A., 3) 79 F. (2d) 256. In this case the in-
come was distributed to the settlor's children during minority. The B. T. A.
had held such not taxable to the settlor and it was affirmed by the C. C. A.
Rehearsing was denied in both of these cases. Jan. 6, 1936. 80 L. Ed. (adv.)
353, 296 U. S.-
75 From a practical viewpoint this is almost equivalent to a power to
revoke, since a trustee may, even though fraudulently, effectively destroy
the trust. Thus it is quite possible that at some future time Congress might
change the law to include such a situation.76Anna B. Hunt (1930) 20 B. T. A. 677.
77 Chase National Bank v. U. S. (1929) 278 U. S. 327.
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But when it is impossible for title to revest in the settlor, even
though the ultimate beneficial ownership might remain undeter-
mined until the death of the settlor, he has parted with title irre-
vocably at the time of the creation of the trust. His death is not
a moving factor in the transferring of any economic benefits.71
This argument proved convincing to several of the lower federal
courts, they emphasizing that the applicability of the tax de-
pended upon the retention of control over the economic benefits
or enjoyment.79
Still it would seem that a right to control the disposition of
one's property is tantamount to ownership. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized this and was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court in the case of Porter v. Commissioner,0 another
buoy in the tumultuous sea of taxation. The impelling element
under the statute was whether or not the donor had retained
any right to control the disposition of the property. If he had,
until his death there was a reserved control with respect to the
property which could determine its ultimate distribution. The
termination of this control resulted in a very definite transfer
from the decedent to the designated beneficiaries. If the Federal
Estate Tax were strictly a transfer tax imposed upon the cessa-
tion of the donor's interest this might be open to criticism, but
the tax is more than that. It is a tax upon the right to transfer
any interest passing from the dead to the living and the death
of the decedent thereby preventing a subsequent change in the
disposition clearly results in such a transfer. And, since such a
transfer in trust does not pass the complete economic interest at
the time of its creation, it is not subject to the gift tax.
A kindred status arises when such control is reserved through
a right to make a change in the settlor's will. It can scarcely be
78 Brady v. Ham (C. C. A. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 454, revg. 38 F. (2d) 659,
laid down as a test, "Whether the donor or decedent has reserved to him-
self control over the economic benefits or enjoyment of the trust property.
If the economic benefits passed under the trust deed from the decedent's
control beyond recall, there can be no transfer tax."
79 Washburn v. White (D. Mass. 1932) 1933 P. H. Fed. Tax Serv. R.
403; Cover v. Burnet (App. D-. C. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 915; Brady v. Ham,
supra, note 78, Anderson, J. concurring in Brady v. Ham, said, "If a power
to alter and divert, absolutely divorced from economic benefits to the holder
of the power is not taxable, our decision is right. But I record my doubt
as to what the Supreme Court will ultimately hold on that." The Supreme
Court ultimately held contra, infra, note 80.
80 (1933) 288 U. S. 436, affg. 60 F. (2d) 673.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss4/1
TRUSTS AND TAXATION
argued that such a transfer is not of a testamentary character.
It clearly reserves the privilege to dispose of property after one's
death. The mere fact that the trust has been made irrevocable
thereby depriving the settlor of the right to return the property
to himself, as already shown, has little effect. Consequently such
reservation of control has been held tantamount to a power to
revoke and properly subject to inclusion in the settlor's estate.81
And even though the settlor specifically fails to exercise this
power, allowing the trust property to pass under the provisions
of the trust indenture, his death is a moving factor in the trans-
fer of the economic benefits and it is still taxable to his estate.82
Even when the power is strictly limited in its terms so as to give
the right merely to modify the relative size of the distributive
shares of the beneficiaries it has been found to be without the
provisions of the "revocability clause" in the estate tax.83
A transfer in trust to pay premiums upon the settlor's life in-
surance policies has already been discussed from the standpoint
of income tax liability.8' A problem also arises under the Estate
Tax when the settlor reserves the right to change the benefici-
aries, and other incidents of ownership. That the reservation of
such a power as to a transfer in trust is equivalent to a power to
revoke and properly taxable as part of the settlor's estate has
been shown.85 The natural result therefrom is to hold as part of
the settlor's estate the value of a trust, the income from which
is to pay insurance premiums, when the settlor reserves the right
to change the beneficiaries. 86 The proceeds of life insurance poli-
cies have been specifically dealt with in the Estate Tax.87 When
81 Maria C. M. F. Valentine (1930) 22 B. T. A. 197; Caroline B. Foster
(1932) 26 B. T. A. 708, affd. (1st C. C. A. 1933). No written opinion. Fred-
erick Foster et al., Ex'rs. (1934) 31 B. T. A. 769.
82 Kimball v. Commissioner (1934) 29 B. T. A. 60, affd. without opinion,
C. C. A. 2, 1934.
I' Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y., Adm'r. (1934) B. T. A. 329. This case
was distinguished in Frederick Foster, supra, note 81, as in this case "she
could not divest the class named as remaindermen but could only designate
the proportions in which the members of the class would take."
84 Burnet v. Wells, supra, note 59.
8 1 Porter v. Commissioner, supra, note 80.
88 Cook v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 995, cert. den. 291
U. S. 660; William Laird (1933) 29 B. T. A. 196.
97 Rev. Act of 1918, s. 402 (f), U. S. C. A. (1934) s. 411, (g) The pres-
ent act is unchanged from the original;
"g) Proceeds of Ins. Policies. To the extent of the amount receivable by
the executor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent on his
own life; and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receiv-
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the proceeds are payable to the Estate there is of course no prob-
lem. But difficulties arise when the proceeds are payable to speci-
fic beneficiaries.
In Chase National Bank v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court
answered a great many of the perplexing problems which had
arisen under this law. 9 An outstanding power residing exclu-
sively in the donor to recall a gift after it is made is clearly a
limitation upon the gift, which makes it incomplete as to the
donor, as well as to the donee, and the termination of such a
power by death is the appropriate subject of a tax upon trans-
fers. The Court treated such a power to change the beneficiaries
as similar in effect to the power to revoke a trust. Thus unques-
tionably the proceeds of life insurance policies in which the in-
sured retains the right to change the beneficiaries may properly
be included in his gross estate.90 Similarly a reservation of the
right to surrender the policy and to pledge it for loans equal to
its surrender value, and other acts of ownership exercised over
the beneficial economic interests make it taxable to the insured's
estate.91
A strict interpretation and literal reading of the act would
lead one to the conclusion that, subject to the exemption, even
though the insured reserves no rights of legal ownership the in-
surance payable to beneficiaries would still be taxable to his
estate. But by construction the Treasury Department has ruled
that the incidents of ownership must be retained by the insured
able by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the
decedent upon his own life."
88 (1929) 278 U. S. 327.
89 In Heiner v. Grandin (C. C. A. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 141, affd. 56 F. (2d)
1082, Cert. den. 286 U. S. 561, the third Circuit Court of Appeals had ap-
plied the same principles to insurance policies as to trusts, holding that a
reservation of a right to change a beneficiary is a limitation upon the gift
which makes the transfer incomplete until the exercise or non-exercise (ter-
mination by death) of the reserved power. And this could apply retro-
actively to policies issued prior to the passage of any such statute as it is
the exercise of the power or its termination by death which causes the trans-
fer of the benefits. Prior, in Frick v. Lewellyn (D. C.) 298 F. 803, affd. in
268 U. S. 487, it had been held that the original statute was not intended
to have retroactive effect. A new subsection (h) inserted in section 302 of
the revenue act of 1924 provided expressly for such retroactivity and thus
corrected this erroneous impression.90 Levy's Estate v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1933) 65 F. (2d) 412; New-
man v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 449, cert. den. 80 L. Ed.
(adv.) 111, 296 U. S.-.
91Balard v. Helburn (1935) 9 F. Supp. 812; E. H. Sharp (1934) 30
B. T. A. 532; Sampson v. U. S. (D. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 95.
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until his death for the tax to apply.92 The reason for such an
interpretation would seem to be a desire to treat this section in
accord with Congressional intent, as evidenced by the other pro-
visions of the Estate Tax, to tax merely the passing of the eco-
nomic interest. When no such rights are reserved and the policy
is irrevocable all economic benefits therein pass immediately and
thus it should not be taxed to the grantor. Since this is merely
an interpretation by the Treasury Department there is no cer-
tainty that it will not be changed nor that the change will not
be upheld by the courts.
Taxability of the income from such a trust has already been
considered. It is quite evident that a reservation of such powers
results in the income therefrom being taxable to the grantor.
Since he retains all the attributes of ownership he may quite
properly be treated as owner.9
Thus a reservation of the right to cha-tge the beneficiaries
either in the trust instrument directly, by will, or in an insurance
policy, renders such trust subject to the estate tax, and the in-
come therefrom is taxable as the settlor's income.
III. CONTROL BY THE SETTLOR PLUS ANOTHER
A. A Trustee
A curious discrepancy between the estate tax and the income
tax has long perplexed the settlors of trusts as well as the courts.
Under the provisions of the estate tax, a trust created by a dece-
dent during his lifetime is treated as revocable if at the time of
his death he retains a power of revocation in conjunction with
"any person."'95 Under the income tax it is treated as revocable
only when subject to revocation in conjunction with "any person
not having a substantial adverse interest." 8 Despite the differ-
ent wording in these provisions, and the persistence of this dif-
ference during many general revisions of both taxes, it was gen-
erally felt that the estate tax would be construed to mean the
92 By construction of Reg. 80, Art. 25. (1936) P. H. Fed. Tax Serv. 23,
296-A. Ballard v. Helburn, supra, note 91; Anthracite Trust Co. v. Phillips
(D. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 910; Parker v. Commissioner (1934) 30 B. T. A. 342;
Martha H. Reybine (1934) 31 B. T. A. 314.
9' See Part II, B. p. 289.
94 Op. Cit. note 10, Sec. 268, p. 869.
95 Supra, p. 282-283.
" Supra, note 42.
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same thing as the income tax.9 "Any person" was translated
rather freely to mean any person lacking a substantial adverse
interest in the trust.9 Still such a view, though it undoubtedly
removed any doubt as to its constitutionality, seriously hamp-
ered the effectiveness of the change embodied in the 1924 Reve-
nue Act. In view of the fact that the normal trust settlement
ordinarily includes among its beneficiaries someone fully ame-
nable to the settlor's wishes, because of social or moral obligation,
a provision requiring such a beneficiary's consent was of no real
restraint upon the settlor's control.
Fortunately the situation has been much clarified by a very
recent decision of the Supreme Court, Helvering v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co.9 "The two sections have a cognate purpose
but they exhibit marked differences of substance. ... To credit
the assertion that the difference in phraseology is without sig-
nificance and in both sections Congress meant to express the same
thought, would be to disregard the clear intent of the phrase
'any person' employed in sec. 302, (d). We are not at liberty to
construe language so plain as to need no construction or to refer
to Committee reports where there can be no doubt of the mean-
ing of the words used. '100 From a practical point of view this
is truly a fortunate decision for it not only simplifies the appli-
cation of section 302 (d) but also seems more fully to effectuate
the intent of Congress to prevent the use of the revocable trust
as a device for escaping the estate tax.
The most obvious situation in which such a reservation of con-
trol should fail to avoid the estate tax is that wherein control is
reserved with the consent of the trustee. Such a proposition first
appeared under the statute taxing a transfer "to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death."101 Reversing the
District Court the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
97 1n connection with s. 302 (d), the House Ways and Means Committee
Report said, "This provision is in accord with the principle of 219 (g) (now
s. 166) of the bill which taxes to the grantor the income of a revocable
trust." H. R. #179, 68th Cong. p. 28.
18 Before the revision of this provision in 1934 it had read "any person
not a beneficiary of the trust," Revenue Act of 1928, s. 166, and the cor-
responding section in the estate tax was interpreted accordingly.
9 (Nov. 11, 1935) 80 L. Ed. (adv.) 1, 296 U. S,
100 Ibid., 1. c. 3; Frew v. Bowers (C. C. A. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 625, cert. gr.
273 U. S. 578, Dis. by consent, 275 U. S. 578.
101 For the statute see, infra, note 138.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss4/1
TRUSTS AND TAXATION
cuit found that the power to revoke was not absolute and uncon-
ditional as it was dependent upon the trustee's consent. Thus the
trust was not taxable to the settlor's estate.10 2 Recognizing the
distinctions in the revocability clauses, already pointed out, in
Erskine v. White 03 the court decided that a trustee was a party
having an adverse interest and thus, in accord with Congres-
sional intent, such was not a revocable trust taxable to the settlor.
The property rights and beneficial interests having passed from
the settlor, subject to revestment only with the consent of the
trustee, there was no taxable transfer at the decedent's death.
Still, even before the Supreme Court definitely passed upon the
problem, some of the Federal Courts reached a contra decision
upon the reasoning that a trustee did not have an adverse inter-
est.10' The privileges which flow from ownership and control bear
upon the power to tax transfers at death and such control is not
relinquished when it requires merely the consent of the trustee.
Generally speaking the trustees owe no duty to the beneficiaries
to resist alteration or revocation of the trust by the settlor. And
this view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., supra, holding that when power to
revoke was vested in the settlor plus a trustee the trust was
properly taxable as part of the settlor's estate.
The broad interpretation which might have arisen from this
case was immediately limited by the Court in White v. Poor.105
In this case the right to revoke was expressly limited to the trus-
tees and such was held not a revocable trust. Nor did the fact
that the settlor was a trustee change the decision since she had
acquired her status "solely by virtue of the action of the other
trustees and the beneficiaries, and not in any sense by virtue of
102 From a practical point of view the decision in this case seems clearly
wrong. The settlor had also reserved the right to change trustees. Having
this right it would seem he could quite effectively control the consent of the
trustee. The words of Hamilton in the Federalist, #79, cited by Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes in his dissent in Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U. S. 245, might
well apply, "Power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his
will."103 (C. C. A. 1930) 47 F. (2d) 1014, affg. 43 F. (2d) 765
104 Witherbee v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1934) 70 F. (2d) 696, cert. den.
293 U. S. 582, rehear. den. 293 U. S. 631; Henrietta G. Fitz (1934) 30
B. T. A. 97; The cases cited, Reinecke v. Smith, infra, note 11, and Porter
v. Commissioner, supra, note 80, both of which, though concerned with in-
come tax liability held that a trustee did not have an adverse interest.
105 (Nov. 11, 1935) 80 L. Ed. (adv.) 8, 296 U. S.-.
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any power reserved to herself as settlor in the original declara-
tion of trust."'' 0 6 The practical aspect of this decision may give
the settlor the opportunity to hazard little loss of control by en-
trusting his property to other members of his immediate family
for a short time, with an understanding that one of the trustees
will resign, and the others, with the beneficiaries, will reappoint
him. This might easily follow since the terms of the decision
make no requirement that the settlor's divestment be more than
momentary. Still, if the court were confronted with an instance
where the substitution of trustees was plainly a device for tax
avoidance it might well reach a contra result.0 7
Another constitutional point involved in the City Bank Farm-
ers Trust Co. case, and which, in view of the companion deci-
sions, 08 appears of some importance is that of retrospective oper-
ation. In this case the tax as applied was a prospective one. The
case arose under the 1926 act and the trust in issue was created
in 1930. The taxpayer was amply warned in advance that such
a transaction was disputable. It was upon this constitutional
point that Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo concurred in
the decision in White v. Poor, supra. They felt that section 302
(d), properly construed, applied to this trust, but if it were so
applied it was fatally retroactive. Thus one might safely hazard
a guess that if the trust in question had been confronted pros-
pectively with the taxing statute the result might have been
contra. And so too in the City Bank Farmers Trust Co. case if
the tax had applied retroactively the decision might have been
different.10 9
TOO Ibid., 1. c. 10; In the trust declaration the settlor had named herself
as one of the trustees. However in the interim she resigned and another
was appointed. Subsequently, however, she was reappointed. The court gave
no clue as to the probable result if she had retained her status as trustee
by virtue of the trust declaration. Still if Helvering v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., supra, were carried to a logical conclusion it would seem that
such a situation would create a trust taxable to the settlor as from a prac-
tical viewpoint it amounts to a right to revoke in conjunction with "any
person." Assuming, of course, that the regalia of a trustee should make
no practical difference.
107 Supra, note 50; infra, note 121.
s08 White v. Poor, supra note 105; Helvering v. Helhholz (Nov. 11, 1935)
80 L. Ed. (adv.) 5, 296 U. S.-.109 Especially in view of the fact that this was a 5 to 4 decision and
Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo constituted part of the majority. The minor-
ity in this case consisted of Justices VanDevanter, McReynolds, Sutherland
and Butler.
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As has been previously shown, the income from trusts revo-
cable only with the consent of one having a substantial adverse
interest is not taxable to the settlor.110 It is clear that a trustee
is not a beneficiary in the ordinary sense of the word. He owes
no duty to the beneficiary to resist alteration or revocation of the
trust, though he does, of course, owe a fiduciary duty to the bene-
ficiary to protect the trust and administer it faithfully. Thus
when it is evident that the power to revoke is vested solely in
the settlor with the consent of the trustee, or trustees, the income
therefrom is taxable to the grantor. This was very definitely
pointed out by the Supreme Court in the clarifying and important
decision of Reinecke v. Smith."' The only difficulty in the prob-
lem arises when the right to revoke is with the consent of one
who, though a trustee, also has some element of beneficial inter-
est. This problem will be considered shortly.
B. Plus a Beneficiary
The Supreme Court seems to have settled this problem, in go
far as the Estate Tax is concerned, by its decision in the City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. case, supra, although with the limita-
tions previously shown.112 The statute embraces such transfers
even though they are complete when made and thereafter beyond
the unfettered control of the settlor. As the court observed,
"Congress may well have thought that a beneficiary who was of
the grantor's immediate family might be amenable to persuasion
or be induced to consent to a revocation in consideration of other
expected benefits from the grantor's estate." Still it would not be
amiss to review the decisions leading up to this case.
In view of the decision in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Com-
110 Supra, notes 97, 98.
MI' (1933) 289 U. S. 172, 174 "The unambiguous phraseology of the act
precludes the suggested construction. A trustee is not subsumed under the
designation beneficiary. Both words have a common and accepted meaning;
the former signifies the person who holds title to the res, and administers it
for the benefit of others; the latter the cestui que trust who enjoys the
advantages of such administration. The ordinary meaning of the terms
used, which we are bound to adopt, and the view held by those charged with
the enforcement of the Act, ratified by reenactment of the section, alike
forbid the adoption of the construction for which the respondents contend."
That construction was that the trustee is a beneficiary of the trust as the
phrase is used in the act.
I'm Supra, p. 41, 42. It applies prospectively and it does not apply when
the right to revoke is solely in the trustees, even though the settlor has sub-
sequently been appointed a trustee.
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pany123 it would have seemed quite reasonable to predict that the
Supreme Court would construe the term "any person" not to
include persons having substantial adverse interests in the sub-
ject matter to which the power relates."i 4 The court there held
that since the power to revoke was dependent upon the consent
of one entitled to a beneficial, and consequently adverse, interest,
for all practical purposes the trust had passed as completely from
any control by the decedent which might enure to his own benefit
as if the gift had been absolute. However it must be remembered
that this case was decided under Section 402 (c) of the 1921
act l 5 and the Court was very careful to point out this fact in
its City Bank Farmers Trust Co. decision. Still, upon authority
of the Reinecke case the Board of Tax Appeals and several fed-
eral courts applied the same theory as to the revocability sec-
tion":16 interpreting the term "any person" to mean "any person
not a beneficiary,"'- and held such transfers in trust not includ-
ible in the settlor's gross estate. 1 8 Others though refused to fol-
lo~v this argument by the taxpayer and held such transfers tax-
able to the settlor's estate."9 The Supreme Court now having
spoken, there is no longer doubt upon this point, viz., that reserv-
213 Supra, note 53.
"14 So able an authority as Bogert so predicted. See, Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees, (1934) Vol. 2, p. 895, under discussion on "Powers jointly held."
.2 This is essentially 302 (c) under the 1926 Act. See (1934) U. S.
C. A. sec. 411 (c). Under 402 (c) the Court also decided Morsman v. Bur-
net (1931) 283 U. S. 783, reversing 44 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A.); and Mc-
Cormick v. Burnet (1931) 283 U. S. 784, reversing 43 F. (2d) 277 (C.
C. A.). In both these cases the settlor reserved the power to terminate or
change the trust with the consent of a beneficiary. The two Circuit Courts
of Appeal held the trusts taxable. The Supreme Court, without opinion,
reversed these decisions upon the authority of May v. Heiner, note 134,
infra.
216 Sec. 302 (d) under the 1924 act. See p. 382, supra.
"17 Supra, notes 97, 98.
1s Louis C. Raegner (1934) 29 B. T. A. 1243, appeal dismissed (C. C.
A.)-F. (2d)-; William B. Kurtz (1931) 22 B. T. A. 1377; Logan v. Den-
man (C. C. A. 1932) 63 F (2d) 1008; Irving L. Stone (1932) 26 B. T. A. 1,
Pet. for Rev. dismissed (C. C. A.)-F. (2d)-; Win. H. McCurdy (Old.
Natl. Bank in Evansville, Ex'rs.) (1934) 31 B. T. A. 379; Lit. v. Commis-
sioner (C. C. A. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 551.
19 Dort v. Helvering (App. D. C. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 836, Cert. denied, 293
U. S. 569, Rehearsing denied, 293 U. S. 630. Commissioner v. Straus (C.
C. A. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 401, it was because of a conflict between the decision
in this case and the decision in Lit. v. Comm'r and City Bank Farmers Trust
Co. v. Commissioner that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the latter
case. Reversing the C. C. A. in the latter case the court has in effect affirmed
this decision.
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ing Dower to amend, alter or revoke, but only with the consent
of the beneficiaries does not make the trust irrevocable within
the meaning of the Federal Estate Tax, and such a trust is still
taxable to the grantor's estate.
Reserving control with the consent of a beneficiary as affecting
income tax liability has been specifically interpreted by the Su-
preme Court in Reinecke v. Smith. .20 Though the Court was par-
ticularly concerned with the question as to whether reservation
of control with the consent of a trustee rendered the trust ir-
revocable within the taxing statute, the language in the opinion
is much broader than that alone.'2 ' The wording of the original
act was "any person not a beneficiary" and thus the courts have
clearly held that when the trust can only be revoked with the
consent of one who is a beneficiary the income therefrom is not
taxable to the settlor. 122 And this is true even though the bene-
ficiary be also a trustee.12 3 But when the right to revoke exists
with the consent of one who clearly is not a beneficiary the in-
come is taxable to the grantor. 24 Continuing its efforts to tax
the retention of control over the economic benefits Congress has
since made a change in phraseology which may be of aid to the
courts. The statute now reads "any person not having a sub-
120 (1933) 289 U. S. 172; ibid., 1. c. 178.
121 "The measure of control of corpus and income retained by the grantor
was sufficient to justify the attribution of the income of the trust to him.
. ..A contrary decision would make evasion of the tax a simple matter.
There being no legally significant distinction between the trustee and a
stranger to the trust as joint holder with the grantor of a power to revoke,
if the contention of the respondents were accepted it would be easy to se
lect a friend or relative as co-holder of such a power and so place large
amounts of principal and income accruing therefrom beyond the reach of
taxation upon the grantor while he retained to all intents and purposes con-
trol of both. Congress had power, in order to make the system of income
taxation complete and consistent and to prevent facile evasion of the law
to make provision by 219 (g) for taxation of trust income to the grantor in
the circumstances here disclosed."
122 Smith v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 56; Margaret A.
Holmes (1932) 27 B. T. A. 660.
128 B. R. Jones v. Commissioner (1932) 27 B. T. A. 171; Olive H. Prouty
v. Commissioner (1934) 30 B. T. A. 1068; Stetson v. Commissioner (1932)
27 B. T. A. 173.
124 Bowler v. Helvering (C. C. A. 1935) 80 F. (2d) 103. When it is
revocable by a majority of several persons, one of whom is a beneficiary,
it is taxable to the grantor so long as there is a possible combination by
which it may be revoked without the consent of one a beneficiary. Lillian
T. Savage (1934) 31 B. T. A. 633. See also Jackson v. Commissioner (1933)(C. C. A.) 64 F. (2d) 359. Greenough v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1934)
74 F. (2d) 25.
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stantial adverse interest." This obviates the necessity of deter-
mining whether the joint holder of the power to revoke is or is
not a beneficiary of the trust within the meaning of the act.
However, the question of a substantial adverse interest in itself
may cause difficulty. It would seem that the rewording of this
phrase will result in a wider inclusion of such trusts within the
act. Under its prior status it was not difficult for one practically
to reserve the right to revoke without the release of any sub-
stantial power of control. Simply by making one amenable to his
wishes a beneficiary, and reserving the right to revoke with his
consent, the transaction would be without the statute. It is quite
possible that under the present phrasing of the statute the courts
would hold such not to be a substantial adverse interest and thus
properly hold the trust income therefrom taxable to the grantor.
If Congress would go one step further and define a "substantial
adverse interest" as not including a member of the family, even
though a beneficiary, it would effectively limit the use of the re-
vocable trust as a means of tax avoidance. It would also greatly
simplify the duties of the court in interpreting the meaning of a
"substantial adverse interest."
C. Plus All the Beneficiaries
Another decision laid down at the same term of court as some
of these other momentous decisions already cited12 would appear
to have settled this point. Helvering v. Helmholze2U involved a
transfer in trust which could be revoked by the settlor only with
the consent of all the beneficiaries. Under the decision in the
City Banl Farmers Trust Co. case one might well reason that
here was a trust revocable with the consent of "any person" and
thus it might properly be included in the settlor's estate. The
court however further limited the effect of this decision and held
that such a trust was not taxable to the settlor. Mr. Justice
Roberts delivered the opinion, saying, "The general rule is that
all parties in interest may terminate the trust. (Citing sections
337,338 of the Restatement of Trusts.) The clause in question
added nothing to the rights which the law conferred. 1 27 Thus
125Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., supra, note 99; Douglas
v. Willcuts, supra, note 71; White v. Poor, supra, note 105; Becker v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., supra, note 54.
126 (Nov. 11, 1935) 80 L. Ed. (adv.) 5, 296 U. S.-.
127 Ibid., 1. c. 7.
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since this right exists under all trusts its express inclusion in an
otherwise irrevocable trust does not operate to make the trust
revocable within the scope of section 302 (d). As Congress seeks
to tax the corpus of the trust as part of the settlor's estate only
when there is such a retention of the economic benefits that his
death results in their transfer this decision seems fully correct.
The transfer is complete when it is made and his death neither
hinders nor furthers it.
And it is quite evident that the income from such a trust is
not taxable to the grantor. The beneficiaries all have a substan-
tial adverse interest to the grantor and thus the trust falls within
the statutory exception.12 8
IV. RESERVATION OF A PARTICULAR ESTATE
The reservation of powers of revocation, the right to change
the beneficiaries, and the right to participate in the management
of the trust are not the only means by which a settlor may retain
an element of control over the transfer in trust. The Federal
Estate Tax concerning itself as it does with the passing of an
economic benefit from the dead to the living, the courts attach
much importance to this shifting of economic interests. It is un-
deniable that a donor who, though irrevocably transferring prop-
erty, reserves a life estate or the right to the income for life,
retains a most important economic benefit therein until his death.
The retention of such interests comes within the scope of section
302 (c).129 To prevent tax evasion by inter vivos gifts used as
a substitute for a will such was absolutely essential. The statute's
objective was to tax transfers similar to transfers by wills and
intestate laws because they accomplish a transfer of property,
donative in effect, under circumstances which impress it with the
characteristic of a disposition made at the time of the trans-
feror's death.
Such a trust raises no problem in relation to income tax. The
income being payable to the settlor it is properly taxable to him.
On the other hand if the income is payable to another the trust,
being irrevocable, does not come within the scope of Section
128 Supra, note 42. •
129 Rev. Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 70, as amended by Joint Resolution #131,
Seventy-first Congress, March 3, 1931. Rev. Act of 1932, sec. 803. See
infra note 138.
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166.130 And unless the income is subject to accumulation for the
benefit of the settlor it would not fall within the provisions of
Section 167.131
A. Income to the Settlor for Life, with the Remainder Over
The simplest situation within the scope of the statute is that
in which the settlor reserves to himself the income therefrom for
life, the trust itself being irrevocable. The remainder over does
not take effect until the death of the settlor. The course of inter-
pretation of similar provisions in state legislation has been to
hold such taxable to the settlor. 3 2 Similarly several of the federal
courts held that such transfers in trust were within the statute.13"
A reservation of income is clearly a reservation of "that which
gives value to the property," the beneficial interest, and this is
what Congress seeks to tax. The donees of such a trust cannot
exercise full dominion over it, sell or otherwise dispose of it, until
the termination of the rights of the donor by death.
Despite the practical logic behind such a view the Supreme
Court laid down a contra rule in a far reaching decision, May v.
Heiner.134 The specific facts in the case show that the settlor
reserved the income to herself only after the death of her hus-
band, but the court did not confine itself to this. In effect it held
that even if she had reserved the income to herself from the very
beginning the trust would not have been taxable as a part of her
estate. 3 5 The District Court had 38 found the trust taxable upon
the theory that in order to escape liability the donee must be in
actual possession and enjoyment before the donor's death, and
must have the use and disposal of the property without reference
130 Supra, note 42.
131 Supra, note 56.
132 Missionary Society v. Bugbee (1925) 97 N. J. Eq. 343, 127 At]. 565;
In re Cochrane (1921) 117 Misc. 18, 190 N. Y. S. 895; In re Barber's Estate
(1931) 204 Pa. 235, 155 Atl. 565.
133 Reed v. Howbert (D. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 641; Coolidge v. Nichols (D.
1925) 4 F. (2d) 112, though the tax could not be applied retroactively. See
also Bradley v. Nichols (D. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 857, wherein the executor ad-
mitted that the statute applied to the one half of the trust to which the
settlor reserved the income for life. Contra however, see Fidelity & Colum-
bia Trust Co. v. Lucas (D. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 146; Estate of August F. W.
Brehmer (1927) 9 B. T. A. 423.
134 (1930) 281 U. S.,233.
135 "The record fails clearly to disclose whether or not Mrs. May sur-
vived her husband. Apparently she did not. But this is not of special im-
portance since the refund should have been allowed in either event."130 (D. 1929) 25 F. (2d) 1004, affd. 32 F. (2d) 1017.
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to the said death. But the Supreme Court cast this aside and
ruled that such a transfer was not testamentary, was beyond
recall by the decedent, and at her death no interest passed, from
her to the living, which was subject to tax.
The full implication of this decision was brought forth the next
year by the decision in Burnet v. Northern Trust Company.'37
The settlor there executed an irrevocable trust reserving to him-
self for life the income. In a Per Curiam decision the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals hold-
ing, under the authority of May v. Heiner, that this was not tax-
able as part of the decedent's estate.
That Congressional intent was not that such a transfer was
to be without the act was immediately made evident. The day
after the memorandum decision Congress amended the statute to
include irrevocable transfers in trust in which the settlor re-
tained for his life, or any period, control over the income from
the corpus of the trust.138 Since in this memorandum decision
the Court explicitly indicated that the question was one of stat-
utory interpretation, and "not the constitutional authority of
Congress to impose prospectively a tax with respect to transfers
or trusts of the sort here involved," there should be no doubt as
to the validity of this act when prospectively applied.
Thus in cases involving trusts executed prior to the 1931
amendment, the trust being irrevocable, the mere reservation of
income to the settlor for life is not sufficient to make it taxable as
a transfer to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after
death.139 The retroactive operation of the present act remains
13T (1931) 283 U. S. 782. See also supra, note 115.
138Joint Resolution #131, approved March 3, 1931, Rev. Act. of 1932,
see. 803 (1934) 26 U. S. C. A. s. 411, (c): "To the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust
or otherwise, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after his death, or of which he has at any time made a
transfer, by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or
for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death. (1) The
possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property,
or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to desig-
nate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom."
139 Hodgkins v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 43, cert. den.
283 U. S. 825; McCaughn v. Carnhill's Ex'rs (C. C. A. 1930) 43 F. (2d)
69, affg. 30 F. (2d) 696; Commissioner v. Austin (C. C. A. 1934) 73 F.
(2d) 758, affg. 26 B. T. A. 1216; Helvering v. Duke (C. C. A. 1933) 62 F.
(2d) 1057, aff'd by divided court, 290 U. S. 591; Blanch L. Block (1930)
20 B. T. A. 782; John D. McIlhenny (1931) 22 B. T. A. 1377; Caroline B.
Foster (1932) 26 B. T. A. 708, aff'd without opinion (C. C. A. (1) 1933).
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an open question."0 The retroactive operation of section 402 (c>
was considered in the well known case of Nichols v. Coolidge."'
The transfer in trust, made prior to the passage of the estate
tax, was irrevocable but the grantor reserved the income there-
from for life. Assuming that such might be within the scope of
402 (c) the Court held that such an application would make the
tax fatally retroactive as being arbitrary and capricious. In view
of this decision, and the Treasury Regulation providing that this
new act shall only be given prospective effect, 42 it is probably
quite safe to say that it will not be applied retrospectively. How-
ever, considering the unsettled status of such laws applied retro-
actively, and that Nichols v. Coolidge was a 5 to 4 decision, even
this is not definite assurance that a future decision by the Su-
preme Court might not result in a change in the Court's attitude
and the ruling of the Treasury Department.
B. Income to Another for Life, with the Remainder Over
Under these facts the grantor reserves neither the right to
retain the beneficial interest therein, as evidenced by the income,
nor the right to revoke. The trust, in its terms, has no reference
to his death and is unaffected whether he lives or dies. At the
time of the transfer title passes out of the grantor and becomes
vested in the beneficiaries, whether in fee, for life, in remainder,
or in reversion. Such would clearly seem not to be taxable to the
grantor's estate.13 Thus when there is an absolute conveyance
in praesenti of an estate in fee in which the possession and en-
joyment is not postponed until the death of the grantor it is not
taxable to him.' 4
A similar situation arose in Shukert v. Allen.'45 The settlor
created a trust which was to terminate in thirty years, the in-
come therefrom to accumulate in favor of the beneficiaries dur-
ing this time. The Supreme Court found this to be an out and out
transfer leaving no interest remaining in the grantor and hence
not subject to inclusion in his gross estate. It would seem that
240 Supra, p. 283.
"4'Supra, note 34.
42Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 18.
S3Frew v. Bowers (C. C. A. 1926) 12 F (2d) 625, cert. gr. 273 U. S. 682,
dis. by consent, 275 U. S. 578.
"4 Bradley v. Nichols (C. C. A. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 47, affg. 13 F. (2d) 47.
245 (1927) 273 U. S. 545, Revg. & F. (2d) 551.
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if the termination of the trust were based upon the settlor's death
the trust would be taxable to the settlor. Since the death of the
settlor is the date at which the trust is to terminate and go to
the cestui, under the theory of taxing the passing of "economic
benefit" this increased benefit to the cestui might well be suffi-
cient to place the corpus in the taxable group. Though it might
also be argued that a transfer of this sort does not give rise to a
cessation of enjoyment and control, and transfer thereof, which
is within the purview of the estate tax.
C. Income to Another for Life, with a Reversionary Interest
in the Settlor
This may arise in several different phases. In all trusts there
is of course a possibility of a reversion to the grantor of the
trust estate upon the failure of the trust purposes. But this was
never within the intention of Congress, as there is no retention
of a beneficial interest.
The most obvious situation which would seem to be within the
meaning of the statute is when the income is granted to an-
other for life with the remainder over to the settlor or his heirs,
or if none, to others. This is merely a life estate in another with
the remainder over to the settlor. Such is obviously an attempt
to circumvent the statute and is in effect the same as a transfer
by will. If the donor dies before the termination of the life estate
the trust passes to his heirs. The only interest with which the
grantor parts is the right to the income for his life. It is the
death of the donor which causes the transfer to pass to his heirs.
Thus the present value of such a reversionary interest is also
subject to inclusion as part of the settlor's gross estate.1 48
The only value to the settlor derived from the creation of such
a trust is the fact that it does result in a reduction of his income
tax. But even the efficacy of this has been greatly deterred by the
passage of the Gift Tax, for the income therefrom each year is
subject to this levy. Specific exemptions under the gift tax do,
however, enable one to make a practical saving in his total taxes,
provided the gift is not too large. There is a total exemption
of $40,000 as to all gifts made at any time by the grantor, and
hIG Commissioner v. Schwarz (C. C. A. 1934) 74 F (2d) 712; Morris
Schinasi (1932) 25 B. T. A. 1153.
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in addition, each year the donor is entitled to make gifts, not
exceeding $5,000 to any one individual, tax free. 147
A somewhat similar situation arises when the settlor reserves
the power to appoint the remainder by will. As previously dem-
onstrated, such a power directly reserved by the donor is tanta-
mount to a power to revoke, and is properly taxable to his es-
tate.148 Somewhat analogous is the case in which the decedent
himself is the donee of a power. While it is true he is not exer-
cising any control over the trust which he himself has reserved,
still, by a retention of such power he does retain control over
valuable economic benefits and the right to transfer them at his
death. This has been specifically dealt with by Congress in sec-
tion 302 (f).141 Under the Revenue Act of 1916 the Treasury
Department sought to include this under the provision "to take
effect in possession and enjoyment at or after death," but the
decision in United States v. Field precluded this possibility.110
Congress, perhaps foreseeing this difficulty, had in the meantime
added section 302 (f) which expressly taxes the exercise of such
a power.11
The act specifically restricts itself to the exercise of a "gen-
147 Rev. Act of 1932, see. 504, 505. The $5,000 exemption does not apply
to future interests. As to what is a future interest within the meaning of
the statute see Wells v. Commissioner (1936) 34 B. T. A. #53. 1936 P. H.
Tax Service 1034.
1248 Supra, p. 34. See also Thomas B. Scott (1933) 27 B. T. A. 1224; Al-
fred J. Reach (1933) 27 B. T. A. 972.
1349 Rev. Act 1918. The present act reads (1934) 26 U. S. C. A. 411, (f);
"To the extent of any property passing under a general power of appoint-
ment exercised by the decedent (1) by will, or (2) by deed executed in con-
templation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after his death, or (3) by deed under which he has retained for his life or
any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any
period which does not in fact end before his death (A) the possession or
enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (B) the
right either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the per-
sons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom; ex-
cept in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth."
150 (1921) 255 U. S. 257.
16lIn recommending the amendment of this law the Ways and Means
Committee of the House, H. R. #767, 65th Cong., 2nd session, P. 21, said:
"A person having a general power of appointment is, with respect to dispo-
sition of the property at his death, in a position not unlike that of its owner.
The possessor of the power has full authority to dispose of the property at
his death, and there seems to be no reason why the privilege which he exer-
cises should not be taxed in the same degree as other property over which
he exercises the same authority."
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eral" power of appointment, 52 and thus it does not apply when
the donee is required to appoint to a specified person or class of
persons.5 3 But it applies even though the donee can appoint by
will only.' 5' This is because such a power is regarded as general
when it is not restricted by the donor to particular objects or
beneficiaries, even though the method of exercising it may be re-
stricted and limited to a testamentary power.
The reason for taxing such a power is that it is of such a
character as to give to the donee actual and practical dominion
of it as fully to all practical intents and purposes as if it were
owned outright. However since the statute taxes only the "pass-
ing" of property under such a power it does not apply to the non-
exercise of the power nor to property which is taken under the
original provisions of the trust.5 5 The problems of ascertaining
when the power is exercised, 156 and when the power is general
are not easy of application. The latter controversy generally
arises due to the varying interpretations by state courts as to
what is or what is not a general power of appointment. Since
the Government has its option to tax not only a general power
but also a special power it would seem quite proper for Congress
to classify such and create a special meaning of such terms for
the purposes of tax law. The state law itself creating merely a
classification there would seem to be no reason for binding the
Federal Government thereby. While Congress cannot change
the law of property in the states it would seem that Congress is
not limited in its selection of subjects for taxation by mere rules
of the state courts.15 7 But nevertheless the Courts have concerned
themselves with the question as to whether or not a power is,
under the state law, general or special.158
1- Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn (D. 1929) 34 F. (2d)
600; Wear v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1933) 65 F. (2d) 665.
153 Fidelty Trust Co. v. McCaughn (1924) 1 F. (2d) 987.
m,' Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn (C. C. A. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 164, affg. 15
F. (2d) 591; Lee v. Commissioner (App. D. C.) (1932) 57 F. (2d) 399,
cert. den. 286 U. S. 563; Stratton v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1930) 50 F (2d) 48.
affg. 42 F (2d) 779, cert. den. 284 U. S. 651.
155 Helvering v. Grinnell (1935) 294 U. S. 153.
13 Vredenburg Minot (1934) 29 B. T. A. 677, Pet. for Rev. dis. 70 F (2d)
1020, wherein it was held that a residuary bequest was an exercise of the
power of appointment held by decedent.
57 Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn, Wear v. Commissioner, supra, note
152; Blackburne v. Brown (C. C. A. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 320, affg. 35 F. (2d)
963.I" Leser v. Burnet (C. C. A. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 756; Old Colony Trust Co.
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A third situation which would seem to fall within the scope
of a transfer "to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or
after death" is that in which an irrevocable transfer in trust
contains a provision whereby upon the decease of the beneficiary,
or the remainderman, prior to the settlor the trust shall vest in
the settlor, whereas if the beneficiary survive the grantor title
shall vest in him in fee simple. Such a case confronted the Su-
preme Court in Klein v. U. S.,1 9 the transfer there being by deed
but the principle involved being the same. The grantee survived
the grantor. Since the vesting of the fee in the grantee was de-
pendent upon the happening of the condition precedent the court
had little difficulty in finding that the transfer was postponed to
take effect in possession and enjoyment at the death of the
grantor. Until the death of the grantor only a life estate was
vested in the beneficiary and his death was the indispensable and
intended event which effected the transmission of the larger
estate from the dead to the living thereby satisfying the terms
of the taxing act and justifying the tax imposed. Mr. Justice
Sutherland there observed, "Nothing is to be gained by multi-
plying words in respect of the various niceties of the art of con-
veyancing or the law of contingent and vested remainders."
In view of two rather recent decisions of the Supreme Court,100
Justice Sutherland joining in the majority opinions, this phrase
would seem to have been rather inopportunely uttered. It is
quite impossible to reconcile these decisions with that in Klein
v. U. S. without reference to a few magic words by one learned
in the "niceties of the art of conveyancing." In the Becker case
a transfer in trust contained the provision that if the beneficiary
should die before the donor then the trust estate shall "revert"
to the donor immediately and absolutely, whereas if the donor
die prior the property shall become the beneficiary's immediately
and absolutely. The practical effect of this provision is clearly
no different from that in Klein v. U. S. Yet the court found that
this changed the tax situation and it did not fall within the pro-
v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 1935) 73 F (2d) 970; Johnstone v. Commissioner(C. C. A. 1934) 76 F (2d) 55, affg. 29 B. T. A. 957, cert. den. 80 L. Ed.
(adv.) 103, 296 U. S.-
159 (1931) 283 U. S. 231, affg. 42 F (2d) 596.
160 Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (Nov. 11, 1935) 80 L. Ed.
(adv.) 49; 296 U. S.; Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (Nov. 11,
1935) 80 L. Ed. (adv.) 54, 296 U. S.-.
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visions of the statute. The magic word in this conveyance was
"revert." "The provision that the trust estate shall 'revert' in
case of the predecease of the beneficiary removes any doubt as
to the completeness of the transfer, if otherwise there would be
any." 1 '1 Similarly in the Helvering case the irrevocable transfer
contained a provision that if the beneficiary predecease the gran-
tor the trust shall terminate and revert to the grantor. .This
case, was, in fact, decided first and was cited by the court in its
decision in the Becker case. The provision was treated as a con-
tingency in the grantor in the nature of a condition subsequent
the occurrence of which was entirely fortuitous so far as any
control, design or volition on his part was concerned. Thus it was
not taxable as a transfer to take effect in possession and enjoy-
ment at or after death.
The decision of the court is clearly not without support of
ample authority both in property law and in tax law. In a grant
upon condition subsequent nothing remains in the grantor or
his heirs except the right to take advantage of the breach of the
condition. This amounts to a mere possibility of reverter which
in itself is not an estate but merely a possibility of having an
estate at a future time. And a mere possibility of reverter would
not seem subject to tax. Thus many of the lower federal courts
have held that the settlor has parted with all right of beneficial
interest and actual control over the property, and his death
merely forecloses the possibility of any reversionary interest.
1 62
Shortly prior to the decision in the Klein case by a Per Curiam
decision the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals which had sustained the tax upon the ground
of the reversionary interest retained. 6 3 The income was payable
to the settlor for life with remainder over to her three children,
but if they predeceased the settlor the trust was to revert to the
settlor. But since the reversal was based upon the decision in
it, Ibid., 1. c. 61.
162 Nichols v. Bradley (1928) 27 F. (2d) 47; Burnet v. Pac. etc. Bank
(C. C. A. 1931) 45 F. (2d) 773, cert. den. 283 U. S. 825, the third trust
therein involved; Peabody v. Commissioner (1931) 24 B. T. A. 787; Com-
missioner v. Dunham (1934) 73 F. (2d) 752; Commissioner v. Bonney(1934) 75 F. (2d) 1008, affg. 29 B. T. A. 45; Emma R. Morse (1933) 27
B. T. A. 1070; Commissioner v. Wallace (C. C. A. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 1002,
cert. den. 293 U. S. 600; George F. Spencer (1934) 31 B. T. A. 171; Amos-
keog Trust Co. v. Field (1935) 10 F. Supp. 635.
163 McCormick v. Burnet (1931) 283 U. S. 784, Revg. 43 F. (2d) 277.
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May v.-Heinerl 64 it would seem that the Court was more con-
cerned with the reservation of income by the settlor than it was
with the retention of the reversionary interest. The exact point
was considered by the Board of Tax Appeals in Duke v. Commis-
sioner, ,6 5 the Board coming to the conclusion that such a mere
possibility of a reversionary interest did not make it subject to
the tax, and this was affirmed by an equally divided court in
Helvering v. Duke.166 Thus there is prior authorization for the
present decree.
The criticism of the court however comes from its apparent
reversal of attitude and decision in Klein v. U. S. True the court
specifically distinguished Klein v. U. S. but the practical effect of
these later decisions is to make it perfectly possible to give away
one's property and still retain an express reversionary interest,
without incurring liability under the Estate Tax, provided that
sufficient respect is paid to the niceties of the art of conveyanc-
ing. As observed by Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the dis-
sent,1 67 "if he had reserved a remainder in himself with gift over,
if he did not survive his daughter" the gift would have been tax-
able. "Instead, by using a different form of words, he attained
the same end and has escaped the tax. Having in mind the pur-
pose of the statute and the breadth of its language it would seem
to be of no consequence what particular conveyancers' device-
what particular string-the decedent selected to hold in suspense
the ultimate disposition of his property until the moment of his
death. In determining whether a taxable transfer becomes com-
plete only at death we look to the substance, not to form."1 It
would seem, clearly, that in these second situations the settlor
fully retained his hold upon the property by reserving the inter-
est, terminable only at his death, by which full ownership would
be restored to him if he survived the beneficiaries, Such termina-
tion of the settlor's reversionary interest would seem to be a
transfer of economic-benefit within the purview of Congressional
intent as evidenced by section 302 (c). The practical result of
164 Supra, note 34.
165 (1931) 23 B. T. A. 1104.
166 (1933) 290 U. S. affg. 62 F. (2d) 1057 Chief Justice Hughes took no
part in the consideration of this case.
'
67 Mr. Justice Stone, the Chief Justice, MY. Justice Brandeis, and Mr.
Justice Cardozo dissented.
168 Supra, note 60, 1. c. 53.
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the establishment of such a trust, with a provision that if all the
beneficiaries predecease him the corpus shall revert to him, is
substantially the same as leaving the property by will to his
family. By determining the liability by the verbal form of the
trust deed the Court seems to be sanctioning a technical method
of tax avoidance which Congress had sought to destroy.
The decision in these two cases has already been extended, be-
ing applied by the Supreme Court to an analogous situation aris-
ing under insurance policies.' 69 The insurance policy provided
that in the case of the prior death of the beneficiaries the pro-
ceeds therefrom should be paid to the decedent's estate. Revers-
ing the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and the
Court of Claims, The Supreme Court applied the principles laid
down in the St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases, and held that these
proceeds were not includible in the insured's gross estate. Jus-
tices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo concurred upon the first
ground of the opinion, viz., the statute was not to be applied
retroactively, and the Chief Justice acquiesced because of the
recent decisions in the St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases.
Whether the recent amendment of the Revenue Act 1 70 will
remedy this defect remains to be seen. It seems that it quite
properly should. Congress has, in this Amendment to the Estate
Tax, clearly expressed a desire to provide that the taxable estate
shall include all property of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer under which until the time of his death he might
by any possibility become entitled to the return of any interest
in it. A reasonable and clear construction of the statute should
result in the inclusion of such interests. A contra construction
by the Court will force Congress into an exhaustive study of the
"niceties of the art of conveyancing."
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout this paper an attempt has been made to point out
that in taxing to the settlor the corpus and income of transfers
in trust Congress has ever had in mind a retention of the eco-
nomic benefits by the grantor. The logic of this position seems
unquestionable. True, it is clearly improper to tax as income of
169 Bingham v. U. S. (Dec. 9, 1935) 80 L. Ed. (adv.) 206; Industrial
Trust. Co. v. U. S. (Dec. 9, 1935) 80 L. Ed. (adv.) 208, 296 U. S.
170 Supra, note 138.
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A income received by B. 171 But when the income received by B
is within the power of A to appropriate, merely having been
diverted to B through an outside channel, the trust, such income,
quite properly, may be regarded as A's income. Similarly the
corpus, remaining within A's control, should be included in the
estate of A. These are the situations which Congress has at-
tempted to meet. The lines which have been drawn have herein
been discussed.
The problem is far from settled. Its development has been
perhaps a process of judicial exclusion and Congressional inclu-
sion. Each time Congress and the courts succeed in crystallizing
the definition of what transactions shall be included in the tax-
able group, and they often do not agree, a differently formulated
problem is developed for the purpose of avoiding taxation, and
the problem arises anew.
It would seem however that under the present law legislative
achievement has ably fostered legislative objective. It still re-
mains possible to reduce one's taxes through the establishment
of a trust, but to do so the settlor does have to pay a price in the
form of a real surrender of ownership and a permanent aban-
donment of the possibility of enjoyment of the economic fruits
thereof.
11 Hoeper v. Tax Commission (1931) 284 U. S. 206, 215.
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